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Immediately after the Al Qaeda terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, one thought that
occurred to many Americans was “things will never be the same.” That reaction reflected a
diminished sense of security – a very natural reaction to the infliction of massive violence on a
nation that had largely been spared war on its home ground for 140 years. In 2006, after the
passage of over four years with no comparable attacks in the United States, the domestic effects
appear to be less dramatic. We know, however, from events in Europe and the middle east that
domestic peace can disappear at any time, and we realize that we were foolhardy to have a strong
sense of personal safety before September 2001. This article addresses the effects of both the
attacks and the nation’s responses, focusing on the substantive law of the fourth amendment.
Several commentaries have addressed the impact of September 11 on governmental
powers and civil liberties.1 This article takes a different perspective, focusing on how we as a
society expect the government to respond to terrorism and how those expectations affect fourth
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See, e.g., The Future of Internet Surveillance Law: A Symposium to Discuss Internet
Surveillance, Privacy & the USA Patriot Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1139 (2004); Philip B.
Heymann, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in the Aftermath of September 11, 25 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 441 (2002); Seth F. Kreimer, Watching the Watchers: Surveillance, Transparency,
and Political Freedom in the War on Terror, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 133 (2004); Donald A.
Dripps, Reflections on the Criminal Justice System after September 11, 2001: Terror and
Tolerance: Criminal Justice in the New Age of Anxiety, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 9 (2003); Steven
Osher, Essay, Privacy, Computers and the Privacy Act: The Fourth Amendment Isn’t Dead, But
No one Will Insure It, 54 FLA. L. REV. 521 (2002). Most articles address the “USA Patriot Act,”
the acronymic nickname of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56, Stat. 272
(hereinafter Patriot Act).
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amendment doctrine.2 Our expectations have changed in two key respects. First, they are based
on an enhanced awareness of the extent to which our private lives are open to public scrutiny.
Second, we increasingly take for granted and accept substantial intrusions by governmental
security measures when we do things we have always thought we have the right to do – travel
by air, enter a federal building, use the internet, drive on a highway.
Several polls and other studies of public attitudes concerning privacy have focused on
responses to September 11. Two points show up repeatedly. More people are willing to part
with some of their individual privacy as part of the war on terror, but at the same time, they are
increasingly aware of inroads on privacy and are concerned about giving up too much. A series
of Harris Poll studies tracked public attitudes from 2001 through 2004. A September 19, 2001,
report analyzing poll data from several major newspapers and other institutions showed strong,
visceral support for expanded security actions in a wide range of areas.3 The company's own
polls from September 2001, March 2002, September 2002, and September 2004 revealed more
nuanced conclusions. American support for enhanced security was strong in September 2001, as
one would clearly expect, but the polls also indicated substantial concerns about potential abuses
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Notwithstanding the importance of the Patriot Act, this article does not address it other
than in a glancing fashion. The Act is both a cause and a result of public reactions to the
September 11 attacks, and in this respect may have substantial effects on the public’s
expectations of privacy. Those effects may change aspects of fourth amendment law.
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America Attacked: What the Polls Tell Us, Harris Poll #46, September 19, 2001,
available at http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=257 (“The attacks have
substantially increased public support for security measures that might erode our civil liberties.
A two-to-one majority believes this is necessary, and modest majorities support giving law
enforcement the power to stop ‘people who may fit the profile of a suspected terrorist,’ broader
power ‘to tape telephones, monitor cell phones and other wireless communications’ and – by
only 50% to 45% – the power to ‘read all private e-mails.’”). See also American Psyche Reeling
from Terror Attacks, Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, September 19, 2001,
available at http://people-press.org/reports/print.php3?ReportID=3.
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by the government, despite overall confidence in the government’s use of new security powers.4
Follow-up polls six months and a year later showed continued support for security measures, but
at somewhat lower levels, and continued reservations about potential abuses.5 By September
2004, the results seemed to reflect a longer term split in attitudes: continued strong support for
some increased law enforcement powers coupled with substantial concern about improper use of
surveillance techniques.6 Looking to the extremes of a fairly wide spectrum of attitudes, 17 % of
the public felt that increased security measures had already taken more than a moderate amount
of their personal privacy, while 35 % felt that the government’s actions had taken none of their
privacy.7
Consideration of such privacy versus security issues should not be limited to law school
classes or debates among policy wonks. The fact that privacy and government investigatory
powers are now part of the national discourse, television documentaries, newspaper editorials,
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Overwhelming Public Support for Increasing Surveillance Powers and, in Spite Of
Many Concerns About Potential Abuses, Confidence That These Powers Would Be Used
Properly, Harris Poll # 49, October 3, 2001, available at
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=260.
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Homeland Security, Harris Poll #16, April 3, 2002, available at
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=293; Special “9/11" Poll, Harris
Poll # 46, September 10, 2002, available at http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.
asp?PID=325. See also Amitai Etzioni & Deirdre Mead, The State of Society - A Rush to Pre9/11, The Communitarian Network for Individual Rights and Social Responsibility, available at
http://www2 .gwu.edu/~ccps/The_State_of_Society.html; Jill Darling Richardson, Poll Analysis:
Concern Growing Over Loss of Civil Liberties, Los Angeles Times, Dec. 21, 2001, available at
http://www.latime.com/news/nationworld/timespoll/la-463pa3an,1,457920.story?coll=1a-newstimes_poll-nation&ctrack=2&cset=true.
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Public Perceptions of Likelihood of Future Terrorist Attack Leads to Continuing
Support for Tough Surveillance Measures to Prevent Terrorism, Harris Poll # 73, October 1,
2004, available at http://harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=501.
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and even radio talk show blather is a good sign.8 Americans are not inclined simply to accept
every loss of privacy without asking appropriate questions. While public awareness portends a
healthy debate on the issues, however, that same awareness may itself erode privacy, at least as a
matter of constitutional law. This article addresses that erosion, focusing on the two
“reasonableness” requirements of the fourth amendment. The starting point is the scope of the
fourth amendment, which applies only where government intrudes on a reasonable expectation
of privacy. The article goes on to consider the central requirement of the fourth amendment, the
prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. The discussion of that prohibition addresses
the growing public and legal acceptance of suspicionless searches, which may pave the way for
approval of racial and ethnic profiling.

I. The “Reasonable” Expectation of Privacy Requirement

Public expectations play two major roles in fourth amendment legal doctrine. The first
and most direct is the gatekeeper role. The fourth amendment applies to “searches and seizures”;
unless a governmental action is a search or a seizure, the fourth amendment is not applicable.
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Increased public attention to privacy issues can be very positive. Not long after the
September 11 attacks, a store clerk asked me about the constitutionality of racial profiling at
airports. She was a white person in a politically conservative region and had only rarely traveled
by air, but she had heard enough to be concerned. See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
The controversy over Bill Clinton and Monica Lewinsky provided a similar teachable moment.
Back in the late 1990's I had lunch at a truck stop during a long trip. At the next table were four
of the most stereotypical long haul truckers you could imagine. They were having a fervent
conversation, but in tones so hushed that no one else in the restaurant could hear what they were
discussing. All of a sudden one raised his voice enough for everyone to hear. He said “You all
don’t understand. If Congress can force the President to produce White House documents, it
destroys the separation of powers under the Constitution.”
4

The Supreme Court’s Katz9 decision in 1967 expanded the understanding of “searches” to
include electronic surveillance of telephone conversations, even in the absence of a physical
trespass, which had been required in prior caselaw.10 The logical premise of Katz was that where
people seek to preserve something as private and then “justifiably rely” on that privacy
expectation, the fourth amendment protects them from unreasonable intrusions by government.11
Actions or things that are knowingly exposed to the public, on the other hand, are not protected
by the fourth amendment.12 As was often the case, Justice Harlan wrote a concurring opinion
that cut through some of the verbal complexity of the majority opinion to articulate the concept
that has since dominated the caselaw – the reasonable expectation of privacy.13 A government
action that intrudes upon a reasonable expectation of privacy is a search and is therefore subject
to the requirements of the fourth amendment; one that does not so intrude is not a search and, at
least so far as the fourth amendment is concerned, is exempt from any requirement that it be
“reasonable.” The crux of the issue in the post-September 11 environment is the extent to which
the expansion of governmental investigative powers and the public’s awareness or acquiescence
in security intrusions have changed our expectations of privacy. Public expectations about
privacy may now be so reduced that what was previously thought to be a reasonable expectation
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Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464-66 (1928); Goldman v. United
States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-36 (1942); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509-12 (1961).
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389 U.S. at 352-53.
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Id. at 361. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“the Katz test . . . has come to mean the test enunciated by Justice Harlan’s separate concurrence
in Katz”).
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of privacy is now unreasonable, with the result that the fourth amendment no longer applies to
some very intrusive governmental actions.
Simple visual observation provides a possible example. We are now subject to regular
video surveillance – indoors and outdoors, in parks, on streets, in government buildings, private
stores, shopping malls, parking lots, and hotel meeting rooms.14 George Orwell anticipated the
24/7 video camera world in his book 1984.15 We can be thankful that interactive television
inside the home is not yet mandatory for us, as it was for the citizens of Orwell’s Oceania.16 But
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“There are 29 million cameras videotaping people at airports, government buildings,
offices, schools, stores and elsewhere, according to one widely cited estimate in the security
industry.” Joseph Pereira, Spying on the Sales Floor, WALL STREET JOURNAL, December 21,
2004, B1. See also Megan Santosus, The Windy City Gets New Eyes, CIO MAGAZINE, Nov. 1,
2004, available at http://www.cio.com/archive/110104/tl_security.html) (city plan to network
2,250 cameras throughout Chicago); Electronic Privacy Information Center, available at
http://www.epic.org/ privacy/surveillance (collection of links to news reports on video
surveillance, legislative action etc.); National Public Radio, available at
http://www.npr.org/programs/morning/features/2002/ / surveillance/020225.surveillance.html
(story concerning various uses of video cameras in U.S. and abroad to increase security). Look
for security cameras at the places you visit in a day. What was once limited to banks and luxury
homes has become a standard protective technique of small businesses and the middle class, and
access to surveillance tapes is commonplace in television drama, perhaps the most potent
destroyer of a reasonable expectation of privacy. Of course, ingenuity begets ingenuity. See iSee
v. 911 “Now More than Ever,” available at http://www.appliedautonomy.com/isee/info2/html
(“iSee is a web-based application charting the location of closed circuit television (CCTV)
surveillance cameras in urban environments. With iSee, users can find routes that avoid these
cameras – paths of least surveillance – allowing them to walk around their cities without fear of
being ‘caught on tape’ by unregulated security monitors.”). I counted four video cameras and a
security observation post in the hotel meeting room at which this article was presented at a
meeting of the Association of American Law Schools.
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GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY- FOUR (Signet ed. 1961).
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Nineteen Eighty Four begins with Winston Smith returning to his apartment, where he
is greeted by a
“voice [that] came from an oblong metal plaque like a dulled mirror. . . . The instrument
(the telescreen, it was called) could be dimmed, but there was no way of shutting it off
completely. . . . The telescreen received and transmitted simultaneously. Any sound that
Winston made, above the level of a very low whisper, would be picked up by it;
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we should and probably do know that cameras are trained on us at many places outside our
homes. Inside many homes, a computer is transmitting a constant stream of information through
the internet, and both government and private businesses are studying that information.17 This
was the trend before September 2001, of course, but the attacks seem to have accelerated both
the surveillance and our awareness of it.
The responses of the courts will probably not be very supportive of privacy. Katz
expanded fourth amendment coverage, but a negative implication of the decision is that once an
expectation of privacy is no longer reasonable, the matter is open to the public and the fourth
amendment has no application.18 Third parties gain access to personal information following
virtually all non-cash business transactions, including credit card and check purchases, bank
moreover, so long as he remained within the field of vision which the metal plaque
commanded, he could be seen as well as heard. There was of course no way of knowing
whether you were being watched at any given moment . . . . You had to live – did live,
from habit that became instinct – in the assumption that every sound you made was
overheard, and, except in darkness, every movement scrutinized.”
Id. At 6-7.
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“In our day-to-day transactions with private sector businesses and services, we release
a significant amount of personal information – about our purchases, our finances, and even our
health. . . . An entire industry has arisen devoted to the creation of gigantic data bases of personal
information that can be analyzed based on purchasing habits, income levels, race, lifestyle, age,
and hobbies and interests.” Darrel J. Solove & Marc Rotenberg, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW
491-92 (Aspen 2003). Computerized government records are equally detailed. The authors note
congressional proposals to utilize state automobile licensing data to create a national database.
Id. at 460. Such data is sometimes obtained by criminals and used for fraudulent purposes, as
indicated by the Choicepoint data theft of 2005. See Hackers get access to 35,000 people’s data,
UPI, Feb. 16, 2005; Robert O’Harrow, ID Data Conned From Firm, ChoicePoint Case Points to
Huge Fraud, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 17, 2005, at E1; Robert O’Harrow, ChoicePoint Data
Cache Became a Powder Keg; Identity Thief’s Ability to Get Information Puts Heat on Firm,
WASHINGTON POST, March 5, 2005, at A1.
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See, e.g. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408-09 (2005); United States v. Knotts, 460
U.S. 276, 281-83 (1983); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32-35 (2001).
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deposits and withdrawals, and internet shopping, as well as both personal and business telephone
calls. Caselaw developed over the last thirty years treats such information as “knowingly
exposed” under Katz on the theory that what a person reveals to a bank, or a telephone company,
or a lender, or an internet service provider cannot reasonably be expected to remain private.19
The only “reasonable” expectation of privacy seems to be an accurate and informed expectation
of complete privacy. In the absence of that degree of privacy, the government can access all of
the information that it wants and has the technological ability to obtain. More significantly, there
is no longer any fourth amendment requirement that the government act reasonably in accessing
or using that information. In other words, losing a reasonable expectation of privacy means
losing fourth amendment protection, and that means losing any constitutional protection against
unreasonable governmental intrusions.
A different and more generous line of fourth amendment analysis occasionally prevails.
Some cases take a normative view of what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Many commentators think this what the Supreme Court meant in Katz.20 This normative
approach holds that Katz’s expectation of privacy was reasonable because our society values the
19

See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976) (bank records); Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741-46 (1979) (outgoing call data); United States v. Phibbs, 999 F.2d
1053, 1077-78 (6th Cir. 1993) (credit card records); Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 335-36 (6th Cir.
2001) (computer subscriber information); People v. Elder, 63 Cal. App.3d 731, 134 Cal.
Rptr.212, 214-15 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (public utility records).
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See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §2.1(d) (4th ed. 2004) (hereinafter
LaFave Treatise); Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment Theory,
41 UCLA L. Rev 199, 250 (1993); Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 403 (1974); Eric Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 DUKE
L.J. 787, 827 (1999). This notion was addressed in recurring comments in Justice Harlan’s
dissent in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 769-95 (1971), in which he showed how the
majority had misunderstood the meaning of the “reasonable expectation of privacy”in Harlan’s
Katz concurrence to come up with the “accurate and informed” notion that now dominates fourth
amendment law. It was, nonetheless, a dissent, and White is as binding as Katz is.
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privacy of telephone communications and not because no third person could be expected to
overhear him, the “accurate and informed” privacy view of the later cases. Changes in time,
issues, and justices make this theory less viable today,21 although it does receive favorable
mention in cases involving virtual intrusions into the home. The most recent “home intrusion”
decision is United States v. Kyllo,22 which involved use of a thermal imager to scan the outside
of a house to detect that certain portions of the roof and walls were relatively hot, from which the
investigators inferred that the inside of the house was being used to grow marijuana. The Court
drew upon language from earlier cases acknowledging heightened privacy expectations in one’s
home because of the intimate personal activities that take place there. It then connected this
greater expectation of privacy to law enforcement use of a device not normally available to the
public, and therefore not readily foreseeable by the occupant, to hold that Kyllo was entitled to
fourth amendment protection for the heat emanating from his house.23
The Kyllo line of analysis is unlikely to halt or even to slow expanded government data
collection practices in the wake of the September 11 attacks. Other than the occasional use of
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It was presented and rejected in a series of cases perhaps best exemplified by
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988). The majority upheld police officers going
through a suspect’s garbage because garbage bagged up and left for pickup is no longer likely to
remain private. Id. at 29-43. The dissent argued that the police violated a reasonable expectation
of privacy because our society does not want people picking through other people’s trash. Id. at
45, 50-56. In other words, even though it is possible, perhaps even likely in some settings that
trash will be viewed by strangers, society believes that people are entitled to privacy with respect
to their disposal of garbage and that their garbage should be protected by the fourth amendment.
In any event, even routine use of military airplanes or facial recognition technology
would probably by held to be outside of fourth amendment protections because they reveal only
a better, more informed image of things “knowingly exposed” to the public.
22

533 U.S. 27 (2001).
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Id. at 40.
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advanced military technology within the United States,24 there is little indication that law
enforcement relies heavily on new technological devices to reach into places or things
traditionally regarded as private under societal norms. Computer tracing systems such as
Carnivore25 might involve greater law enforcement access to individual computer usage data
than in the past, but such data is already so widely available to private industry that any
expectation of privacy a person holds in this area is due to ignorance rather than technological
reality. Amazon, Tower Records, and Brown University already know that I am largely a
netscape, westlaw, yahoo person rather than a microsoft, lexis, google person. Under fourth
24

There does not appear to be widespread use of advanced military technology in law
enforcement. Reconnaisance aircraft equipped with electro-optical and infrared sensors were
provided during the search for the D.C. area snipers in 2002. See Steve Vogel, Military Aircraft
with Detection Gear to Augment Police, Washington Post, Oct. 16, 2002, p. A1. An article in
Slateexplained how rarely the military assists in law enforcement due to the Posse Comitatus
Act. Philip Carter, Why Can The Army Help Cops Catch the D.C. Sniper, Slate, posted Oct. 17,
2002, available at slate.msn.com/?id=2072727. The other use of sophisticated technology
heavily reported in recent years was the use of facial-recognition software to scan persons seen
by video camera at the 2001 Super Bowl, which predated the September 11 attacks. See, e.g.,
Louis Sahagun & Josh Meyer, Secret Cameras Scanned Crowd at Super Bowl for Criminals,
LOS ANGELES TIMES, Feb. 1, 2001, at 1; Editorial, Super Bowl Snooping, NEW YORK TIMES, Feb.
4, 2001, at section 4, p. 16. Robert O’Harrow, Facial Recognition System Considered for U.S.
Airports; Reagan National May Get Scanning Device, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 24, 2001, at
A14. The Harris Poll of September 2001 reported support for use of facial recognition
technology in the war on terrorism by 86 % to 11 %. See Overwhelming Public Support, supra
note 4.
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Carnivore is a computer system intercept mechanism that can monitor a person’s
private electronic communications, including email and internet browsing. See Graham Smith,
Comment, A Constitutional Critique of Carnivore, Federal Law Enforcement’s Newest
Electronic Surveillance Strategy, 21 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 481, 482 (2001). A central privacy
debate concerns keeping statutory privacy protections up to date with such technological
advances. See, e.g., Robert Steere, Keeping “Private E Mail” Private: A Proposal to Modify the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 33 Val. U.L. Rev. 231, 253-54 (1998). Carnivore itself
became a victim of technological advancement. In January 2005 the FBI reported that it had
stopped using carnivore. The bad news is that it did so because the Bureau found commercially
available software to be more effective at monitoring other people’s keystrokes. See Richard
Schmitt, New FBI Software May be Unusable, Los Angeles Times, Jan. 13, 2005, at A1; FBI’s
Carnivore is Toothless, eWeek, Jan.24, 2005, at 18.
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amendment law, that means that the government may know it as well. In law, if not in cultural
belief, the Patriot Act and other statutes grant us privacy rights beyond those of the fourth
amendment because they impose some limits on governmental access to or use of personal
information.26
The more we become accustomed to video camera surveillance whenever we are outside
our homes and to public and commercial access to information about our private lives, the less
we retain any actual expectation of privacy. As a legal matter, that shrinks our reasonable
expectations of privacy, which accelerates the trend by making us even more accustomed to
government and private intrusions on privacy. The change in our expectations also costs us
judicial oversight of police surveillance activities, because if there is no search, there is no
constitutional law to restrict those activities.

II. “Reasonable” Searches and Seizures

Public perceptions play into fourth amendment doctrine in a second way, one that is less
direct but equally significant. The central requirement of the fourth amendment is that searches
26

Pen register or caller-id information and data in the custody of other persons or
businesses are not protected by the fourth amendment. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying
text. Federal statutes, however, impose privacy restrictions, such as requiring court orders or
subpoenas on certification of some level of proof or showing of relevance to a criminal or
national security investigation. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 2701-2709 (2003) (telephone records, email
held in third party storage); 18 U.S.C. 3121-3127 (2003) (trap and trace devices, pen registers).
The Patriot Act loosened some procedures for obtaining such data. E.g., Section 216 (expanding
scope of data obtainable about email; allowing nationwide execution of court orders authorizing
use of pen registers, etc.); Section 210 (allowing law enforcement subpoenas of credit card and
bank account information from a communication service provider). In these and similar
respects, the Patriot Act trimmed statutory privacy protections, but still maintained a zone of
privacy beyond that required by the Constitution.
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and seizures must be reasonable in order to be constitutional. In theory, the warrant and probable
cause requirements provide a basic minimum standard of “reasonableness.” In practice,
however, most searches and seizures fall within exceptions to one or both of those requirements
and may take place without a warrant or probable cause. As a result, approval or disapproval of
a search or seizure often turns on a general judicial assessment of what is reasonable.27 These
general “reasonableness” inquiries often mirror public attitudes about government actions that
intrude for law enforcement or other purposes. Examples that relate to the war on terrorism
include special needs searches and “stop and frisk” law, each of which can present racial
profiling issues.

A. Special Needs Searches and Seizures

Many of the intrusive actions by government agencies in terrorism investigations are
“special needs” searches, premised on national security or public safety rather than criminal law
enforcement. The notion behind “special needs” is that searches for reasons other than criminal
law enforcement should be exempt from traditional warrant and probable cause requirements,
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See, e.g., STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL
th
PROCEDURE 86 (7 ed. 2004). See also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (describing the warrant requirement as “so riddled with exceptions that it [is]
basically unrecognizable.”). Justice Scalia cites Professor Craig Bradley’s 1985 law review
article, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1473-74 (1985), which
noted over twenty warrant or probable cause exceptions. Bradley’s list does not include more
recently acknowledged exceptions for special needs, drug tests, inventory, containers, protective
sweeps, public safety, student searches, national security electronic surveillance, and a variety of
intrusions from dog sniffs to garbage seizures deemed outside fourth amendment protections
because no reasonable expectation of privacy exists.
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which make sense only in the context of criminal investigations.28 Warrants are rarely required,
and while some justification for the intrusion is required, that justification is far less than
individualized probable cause. Courts often allow across-the-board privacy invasions based on
little more than the featherweight requirement of a rational basis.29 This is the source of law for
routine safety screening at airports and courthouses, as well as various forms of regulatory
searches, such as D.U.I. checkpoints and drug testing.30 Fourth amendment doctrine has allowed
reasonable safety or security-based intrusions into persons and their belongings for many years.
After September 11, however, growing public acceptance of more intrusive searches means that
we are now much more likely than ever to characterize routine use of highly intrusive practices
as reasonable, and therefore constitutional.
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See LaFave Treatise, supra note 20, at chapter 10.
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Special needs searches are judged through a balancing test that was described by the
Supreme Court in Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997). The application of this approach to
national security electronic surveillance, and by implication, other actions with a security
objective, was addressed in In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, 310 F.3d 717, 744-46 (F.I.S. Ct. Rev.
2002).
30

E.g., cases discussed in text and notes 31-33, infra (airports); United States v. Green,
293 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2002) (protecting military installations from terrorism); McMorris v.
Alioto, 567 F.2d 897, 899-901 (9th Cir. 1978) (upholding weapons search at public building);
Grider v. Abramson, 180 F.3d 739, 748 (6th Cir. 1999) (upholding magnetometer at KKK rally at
courthouse); Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990); (D.U.I. roadblock);
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (drug testing); Board of
Education v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (upholding drug testing of all students in extracurricular
activities); Legal Aid Society v. Crosson, 784 F.Supp. 1127 (S.D.N.Y 1992) (upholding use of
magnetometers in juvenile courts, noting routine use in state since mid-1980s); Downing v.
Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230 (6th Cir. 1972) (permitting searches of bags and packages of all persons
entering federal courthouses); Romo v. Champion, 46 F.3d 1013 (10th Cir. 1995) (safety search
of persons entering prison parking lot). Cf. Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2004)
(compelled DNA testing); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (no warrant or probable
cause needed for junkyard inspections under statutory regulatory scheme). The Supreme Court
has described similar security measures at public buildings as “routine.” Chandler v. Miller, 520
U.S. 305 (1997).
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Air travel provides a good example. Not many years ago people could get on an airplane
almost as easily as they could get on a bus. Air passenger screening came after a rash of
skyjackings in the 1960's, and at first the intrusions generated controversy under the fourth
amendment.31 Airports are now an obstacle course of magnetometers, hand-held metal
detecting wands, x-ray machines, explosives-sniffing dogs, and more. The change in security
practices at airports has meant that it has been a very long time since people thought of
magnetometers as too intrusive or a requirement that passengers submit carry-on items to x-ray
machines as unreasonable. The reason is our society’s gradual decision that such measures are
effective in promoting safety on airplanes and that the resulting loss of privacy is relatively
painless. In 1972, Second Circuit Judge Henry J. Friendly warned in connection with a
magnetometer case, “[a]t least so long as the present wave of airplane hijacking continues,
permissible subjection of airline passengers and their baggage to a search for objects that might
be used for air piracy or to cause or constitute a threat of an explosion goes far beyond this.”32
Magnetometers and other security searches and seizures later came to courthouses and
schools, resulting in substantial litigation, most of which upheld at least limited use of such
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The LaFave Treatise has a lengthy section on the past and present of airport searches.
Supra note 20, § 10.6. A task force formed to respond to a number of skyjackings in the 1960's
proposed several mechanisms, including broad use of magnetometers and frisks or searches of
suspicious passengers. A 1972 Federal Aviation Administration regulation required airlines to
use one or more of the mechanisms. FAA Press Release No. 72-26 (Feb. 6, 1972); see 14 CFR
section 121.538 (1973). Caselaw of the period upheld magnetometers used in connection with
behavioral profiles under theories from consent to early versions of “special needs.” E.g., United
States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908-15 (9th Cir. 1973) (passengers can avoid screening by electing
not to board); United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 499-501 (2d Cir. 1974) (balancing need
against intrusion). See also United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180 (3d Cir. 1972); United
States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1972).
32

United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 674-75 (2d Cir. 1972) (Friendly, C.J., concurring).
His reference was to use of a magnetometer and pat-down of a person who set off its alarm.
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searches as constitutional under the special needs rubric.33 Before the September 11 attacks, the
Supreme Court casually noted the validity of “searches at places like airports and government
buildings, where the need for such measures to ensure public safety can be particularly acute.”34
Since the attacks, we have seen new requirements that passengers produce photo identification
and that subject checked as well as hand-carried baggage to manual, item-by-item searches.35
There is now virtually no privacy for anything traveling by air, and the result may be that our
acceptance of these intrusions as reasonable will permanently render domestic travel subject to

33

See supra note 30.

34

City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37-38 (2000). Circuit Judge Alex
Kozinski wrote the following in a case about courthouse security measures:
No one goes through security checkpoints for the pleasure of it. It’s intrusive. It may
force you to come into physical contact with perfect strangers. It delays your progress
toward your destination. It’s a bother. It’s a nuisance. It’s a pain in the neck. But most
people put up with it without complaint because they understand that security screenings
serve an important purpose: safeguarding us all from armed attack. At airports alone,
over a billion screenings – four for every man, woman and child in the United States –
are conducted each year. . . . Although such screenings can be inconvenient, we all feel a
good deal more secure knowing that our fellow airline passengers aren’t carrying guns,
knives and guns.
Klarfield v. United States, 1992 U.S.App LEXIS 11267 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting).
35

Congress passed two laws shortly after September 11, the Air Transportation Safety
and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001), and the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001), both codified in
various sections of 49 U.S.C. See LaFave Treatise note at §10.6. These laws required screening
all airline passengers. One method for doing so is by a computer-based screening system that
assigns security risk levels and search protocols to known individuals based on their risk level.
The Transportation Safety Administration has not been successful in implementing the program
to date. See, e.g., Robert O’Harrow, Airport Screening System Touted as Improvement,
Washington Post, Aug. 27, 2004, p. E3; Leigh A. Kite, Note: Red Flagging Civil Liberties and
Due Process Rights of Airline Passengers: Will a Redesigned CAPPS II System Meet the
Constitutional Challenge?, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV.1385, 1390-92 (2004).
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the sort of governmental powers previously reserved for international border crossings.
Identification requirements could conceivably become internal passport requirements. It is even
conceivable that the courts could deny the application of the fourth amendment at all on the
premise that there is no longer any reasonable expectation of privacy while traveling by air.
Has this change been bad? It is hard to say yes, because most of us would rather be
certain that bombs are being kept off airplanes than have our baggage inviolate and our pockets
unscanned. It was terrorists, after all, and not the government, whose actions have made such
searches seem “reasonable” to most of us. But it represents a major change in public attitudes,
and it is a change that the courts will probably recognize as permitting more security “special
needs” searches without probable cause or a warrant than in the past. And as long as
expectations drive the scope of fourth amendment protection, once an intrusion moves from the
“unreasonable” to the “reasonable” category, it may never be able to move back.

B. Stop and Frisk

“Stop and frisk” law arises from Terry v. Ohio,36 a 1968 decision upholding the police
practice of requiring suspicious individuals to stop and submit to limited searches in the absence
of a warrant and on less than probable cause.37 Stop and frisk law has been the biggest growth
area in fourth amendment law for nearly forty years.38 This is probably because Terry both
36
37
38

392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Id. at 30-31.

The “Stop and Frisk” materials take up over 400 pages in the LaFave Treatise, as many
as any other body of search and seizure law. The same trend applies to casebooks, which have
expanded steadily over the editions, with the largest expansions generally in the stop and frisk
16

added to the roster of police actions subject to fourth amendment restrictions and created an
entirely new standard of justification for such mini-searches and mini-seizures, “reasonable
suspicion.”
The application of stop and frisk law to the intrusions common in terrorism
investigations, such as security screening at airports, is obvious. Even before September 2001,
numerous stop and frisk cases involved confrontations at airports.39 Many of those cases, most
involving drug prosecutions, turned on whether the person was “stopped” without reasonable
suspicion. Most confronations began with a law enforcement officer walking up to a traveler and
asking questions. The issue was whether the officer’s actions amounted to a “stop,” which
brings the fourth amendment into play, or was a mere “encounter,” not subject to fourth
amendment analysis. In encounters, people have the right to “keep on moving” and to decline
police inquiries.40 The key fact in determining whether a stop has taken place is whether the
person reasonably believes he or she is not free to leave.41 If a stop has taken place, the police

materials. A thirtieth year anniversary symposium on Terry took up 800 law review pages.
Symposium, “Stop and Frisk” In 1968: The Issue, The Cases and the Supreme Court’s
Decisions in Terry v. Ohio, Sibron v. New York, and New York v. Peters, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
721-1525 (1998).
39

Supreme Court cases in the canon include United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1(1989);
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980). Less
cited today, but still pertinent to analysis in this area, are Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980)
and Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1(1984). Many cases in the courts of appeals and state courts
concern use of the drug courier profile at airports. See infra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
40

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J. concurring) (suspect is not
obligated to answer requests for information); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984)
(adopting White view). In Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court, 542 U.S. 177 (2004), the Court
recognized a state power to require suspects to identify themselves, but took care to limit that
power to stops based on reasonable suspicion, id. 185-89.
41

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501-02 (1983); see also United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544 (1980). While Royer is a four-justice plurality, the test is endorsed by a majority,
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must have reasonable suspicion to justify their actions.
One public perception emanating from the September 11 attacks and the resulting
additional security measures at airports seems to be that any inquiry by a government official at
an airport, especially one by an armed law enforcement or security officer, is mandatory. That at
least seems to be the view of second year law students in 2005, who share the perception that
airports are in effect martial law zones.42 The traditional notion that people are generally free to
come and go and to decline to answer police questioning seems quaint, at least in connection
with airports or other security zones. That perception should in theory expand fourth amendment
protection because it makes it more likely that courts will find that a fourth amendment stop has
occurred. Thus, more police/traveler contacts of the sort mentioned above would be subject to
the reasonable suspicion standard. The counterbalance, however, may be that the widespread
recognition of the need for heightened security at airports means that most (perhaps all) such
contacts will be deemed reasonable, even if not justified by actual individualized reasonable
suspicion, as originally contemplated under Terry. The same could be said for almost any public
building or gathering place that could be identified as a possible terrorist target. Thus, the Terry
standard may become weakened as a side effect of the public’s increasing tolerance of intrusive
questioning and search practices.

see 460 U.S. at 514 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), and has been treated as established law since then
by the Supreme Court. E.g., INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984); California v. Hodari D, 499
U.S. 621 (1991); United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002).
42

My spring 2005 Criminal Procedure students seemed surprised that anyone would
think that a person could walk away from a security inquiry at an airport, the premise of
Mendenhall and Royer, among other cases. Members of the class included a professional pilot, a
state legislator, a police officer, and several public and private executives.
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C. Profiling

Profiling provides another example of the potential impact on fourth amendment law of
greater security at airports and elsewhere in connection with security investigations. Profiles
generalize and disseminate the knowledge of veteran law enforcement officers about observable
facts and circumstances that can be linked to crime so that less experienced officers can identify
likely criminals. Some profiles are fairly obvious, even to those with no law enforcement
experience. Law students recognize that the suspects in Terry fit an informal profile of “thieves
casing a store,” and that a barber with only one chair but six telephones in his or her shop is
probably a bookmaker.43 Other profiles are less obvious, such as that drug couriers tend to
purchase airplane tickets with cash in small denominations.44 Some profiles are arguably
offensive, such as that motorcyclists are gang members, and some are worse than merely
offensive. The latter include racial or ethnic stereotypes, such as those that portray African-

43

Terry, 392 U.S. at 5-7. It is useful in class to compare such hypotheticals to the facts
of Spinelli v. United States, 393 US. 410 (1969), in which the Court noted that two telephones
were too few to be incriminating. Id. at 414. The point at which common behavior becomes
sufficiently noteworthy to be suspicious is when a profile becomes credible. Occasionally
profiles turn up in unusual situations. See, e.g., State v. Althiser, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 6054,
11 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (profile of a mussel poacher).
44

Purchasing airplane tickets with small bills is one of the “seven primary
characteristics” in the drug courier profile, as described by the Fifth Circuit in United States v.
Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1039 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979). Other characteristics are more suspicious (e.g.,
use of an alias) or less suspicious (e.g., travel to or from almost any major U.S. city) standing
alone. Many cases address the drug courier profile. E.g., United States v. Hooper, 935 F.2d 484
(2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Millan, 912 F.2d 1014 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Hernandez-Cuartas, 717 F.2d 552 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Manchester, 711 F.2d 458
(1st Cir. 1983); United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717 (6th Cir. 1977); Cresswell v. State, 564
So.2d 480 (Fl. 1990); Grant v. State, 461 A.2d 524 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983); State v.
Washington, 364 So.2d 958 (La. 1978).
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Americans as drug couriers or dealers.45 Much foolish or offensive profiling begins with an
observation that seems to have some statistical correlation to crime, and then inverts it to make a
fallacious assumption. The fact that many drug dealers drive SUVs somehow turns into “people
45

There is a substantial body of literature concerning racial profiling directed at AfricanAmericans. See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THREAT AND HUMILIATION, RACIAL PROFILING,
DOMESTIC SECURITY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES (2004); KENNETH MEEKS,
DRIVING WHILE BLACK (2000). Law review treatments include Tracey Maclin, Race and the
Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333 (1998); Lenese C. Herbert, Bete Noire: How RaceBased Policing Threatens National Security, 9 MICH. J. RACE & L. 149 (2003); David A. Harris,
“Driving While Black” and ll Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic
Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544 (1997). The phrase “driving while black” has so
entered world consciousness that the major plot device to introduce the characters of the BBC
television series 55 Degrees North, was a race-based traffic stop of the protagonist, an AfricanEnglish police detective. Episode 1, televised in the U.S. by BBC America as Night Detective,
Jan. 31, 2005.
An example of the occasionally off-handed manner in which some courts address racebased policing is United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1992), in which the court
upheld a stop of a passenger because of facts in addition to his race and appearance, id. at 394.
The court indicated that the stop would have been illegal if race had been the only basis for
suspicion, but that the officer was allowed to act, at least in part, on his knowledge that all-black
Los Angeles gangs were distributing cocaine in Kansas City. Id. and n.2. A strong dissent
challenged the reliance on race. Id. at 396-97. See also United States v. Malone, 886 F.2d 1162,
1163 (9th Cir. 1989) (suspect fit profile of Los Angeles Gang member – young, black male
wearing blue jacket (gang color)). The Sixth Circuit has addressed the matter in a number of
cases, most based on airport encounters or stops of African-Americans. Typical in result and
subtext but atypical in providing several different ways to look at the issues is United States v.
Taylor, 956 F.2d 572 (6th Cir. 1992), in which the full appeals court upheld a stop of a
suspiciously nervous person who happened to be the only African-American on the flight, id. at
575-76, with a concurring opinion troubled by the racial aspects of the case, id. at 579-80, and
compelling dissents analyzing the record, caselaw, and history to find illegal racial
discrimination in law enforcement, id. at 580-92. See also United States v. Avery, 137 F.3d 343,
352-57 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding fourth amendment and equal protection violations in racial
targeting for encounters and stops). Racial profiling can harm persons other than AfricanAmericans. Hispanics are subject to it for narcotics and immigration offenses. E.g., United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882 (1975) (noting impropriety of basing stops on
apparent Mexican ethnicity); id. at 888 (concurring Justice Douglas describing the practice as “a
patent violation of the Fourth Amendment”); Susan Sachs, Latino Profiling Seen in Immigration
Agency Files, NEW YORK TIMES, May 1, 2001, at A21. Even white people who go into the
“wrong” neighborhoods or socialize with African-Americans can be targeted as well. E.g., State
v. Kuhn, 517 A.2d 162, 165 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1986); State v. Letts, 603 A.2d 562, 564-65 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1992).
20

who drive SUVs are drug smugglers.” At best this sort of thinking leads to a waste of resources,
but it is even worse when poor logic turns into racist stereotyping. The fact that a high
percentage of robberies in inner cities are committed by teenage African American males
becomes a profile that depicts teenage African American males as robbers. In reality, the high
percentage of African Americans among inner city residents explains the racial aspect of the
pattern (age and gender may be more significant), but the fact that only a small percentage of the
identified group commits such crimes becomes lost. The result of creating such a profile, then, is
that potentially millions of people can be unfairly tagged with suspicion.
Perhaps sensing the potentially useful but fearful of the dangerous ramifications of
profiling, most courts pretend that they do not exist. Thus, in United States v. Sokolow,46 the
Supreme Court tersely noted the long history and use of the drug courier profile, but rejected the
notion that its use either supported or detracted from a determination that there was reasonable
suspicion justifying a stop.47 That approach appears to be consistent with a widely cited Fifth
Circuit decision that treats profiles as irrelevant to fourth amendment determinations.48
In the 1990's, racial profiling became a matter of public and media attention, much of it
concerning racially based automobile stops and consent searches in the Interstate 95 corridor on

46

490 U.S. 1 (1989).

47

The issue came up in the context of Sokolow’s challenge to the adequacy of reasonable
suspicion, claiming that the agents relied on the profile. Id. at 10. In an earlier case, Reid v.
Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980), the Court had noted that the suspect met the drug-courier profile,
but concluded that the facts described by the agent did not constitute reasonable suspicion. 448
U.S. at 440-41.
48

United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 600 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc) (“We conclude that
the profile is nothing more than an administrative tool of the police. The presence or absence of
a particular characteristic on any particular profile is of no legal significance in the determination
of reasonable suspicion.”).
21

the East Coast.49 Politicians took more aggressive stands than the courts on this issue. From
about 1998 to early 2001, politicians of both major political parties and throughout the political
spectrum condemned racial and ethnic profiling.50 A national consensus against racial profiling
seemed to be developing – there was to be no justification for government action when the
decision was based on the race or ethnic origin of the “suspect.” In short, politicians recognized
that public opinion rejected racial profiling, notwithstanding the enigmatic stance of the courts
on the legitimacy of the practice.
49

There is substantial material on the racial profiling controversies in this area, focusing
on New Jersey. Two cases that helped press the matter are State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1996) and State v. Smith, 703 A.2d 954 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1997), which analyzed
discrimination claims and statistical evidence showing a strong likelihood that many officers
targeted minority drivers for traffic stops.
50

Both 2000 presidential candidates strongly condemned racial profiling. Vice President
Gore supported a federal statute banning the practice; then-Governor Bush stated: “We ought to
do everything we can to end racial profiling.” Text of Oct. 11, 2000 debate, NEW YORK TIMES,
OCT. 12, 2000, AT 22. See generally Rivals Focus on Foreign Policy, ST. LOUIS DISPATCH, Oct.
12, 2000, at A1; Richard L. Berke, The 2000 Campaign: the Overview, NEW YORK TIMES, Oct.
12, 2000, at A1.
That year also saw New Jersey acknowledging a systematic practice of racial profiling of
minority drivers and a commitment by Republican Governor Christie Whitman that this would
begin “the end of racial profiling in America.” David Kocieniewski & Robert Hanley, Racial
Profiling Was the Routine, New Jersey Finds, NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 28, 2000, at 1.
Conservative columnist Lars-Erik Nelson praised the action of U.S. Customs Commissioner
Raymond Kelly in ending that agency’s unofficial but common practice of racial profiling people
for “extra attention” at borders. Lars-Erik Nelson, Changing the Profile, NEW YORK DAILY
NEWS, Oct. 15, 2000, at 52. See also Elizabeth Rogers, Fear of Driving, Congress considers
study of racial profiling in police traffic stops, ABA JOURNAL, July 2000, at 94; Nino Amato.
Editorial, Want to Do Something for Justice? End Racial Profiling, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison,
Wis.), May 17, 2000, at 9A; Scott Bowles, Bans on Racial Profiling Gain Steam, Legislatures
Across the USA Debate the Police Practice of Stopping Motorists Based on Their Race, USA
TODAY, June 2, 2000, at 3A. Numerous cases in the 1990's criticized racial profiling, even if
they did not always find a legal remedy. E.g., State v. Donahue, 742 A2d 775, 788 and & n.11
(Conn. 1999) (racial profiling not found, but describing the practice as “insidious”); United
States v. Avery, 137 F.3d 343, 352-58 (6per th Cir. 1999) (recognizing an equal protection basis
for challenges to racial profiling); United States v. Ornelas-Ledesma, 16 F.3d 714, (7th Cir. 1994)
(reliance on the drug courier profile alone would subject a large portion of the hispanic
population to stops, describing the practice as “redolent of police state tactics”).
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September 11 may have changed this. People know that the September 11 terrorists (and
probably most members of Al Qaeda) were middle eastern Muslims, and as far as many people
are concerned, the only threat justifying the new security measures is middle eastern terrorism.
Accordingly, it is logical in the profiling sense to determine that at least at airports, there is good
reason to rigidly screen persons who seem to be of Arab descent, but no equal justification for
treating other passengers in the same way. The result of such a determination would be
extremely intrusive screening of many thousands of United States citizens of middle eastern
ancestry who are loyal to this country and no more likely to become terrorists than anyone else.
Many people recognize the inequity but do not really care. Those who favor racial profiling in air
security matters are not silent on this aspect of the issue, and supporters come from a variety of
political viewpoints.51
The rules that now apply at airports provide for screening of all persons and property,
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E.g., Michael Kinsley, Discrimination We’re Afraid to be Against, 12 THE RESPONSIVE
COMMUNITY 64 (2001); John Derbyshire, A (Potentially) Useful Tool, 12 THE RESPONSIVE
COMMUNITY 67-70 (2001-02); Henry Weinstein, et al., After the Attack; Law Enforcement, LOS
ANGELES TIMES, Sept. 24, 2001, at 1 (noting statements concerning profiling of Arab persons);
Michael Beebe & Douglas Turner, The Lockdown Life, BUFFALO NEWS, Sept. 23, 2001, at A1
(noting comments by New York officials for and against profiling). See also Associated Press
Poll, reported by Orin Kerr on Dec. 18, 2004 in the Volokh Conspiracy blog, concluding that a
substantial minority still favors profiling Muslims or imposing other civil rights limitations. See
Volokh Conspiracy, available at http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2004_12_12_2004_
12_18.shtml Some of the responses to the airport searches of former Vice President Gore, see
infra note , favored targeting Muslims for airport searches. E.g., Transportation – Prime
Suspects, FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, June 20, 2002, at B-6 (listing a dozen terrorism-related actions
directed at the United States by Muslim extremists and concluding: “If a tall, young Caucasian
man had robbed a bank in downtown Jacksonville and the cops were stopping short, elderly
Chinese women for questioning all over town, one might think something was amiss.”);
Editorial, P.C. Security Checks, PROVIDENCE JOURNAL-BULLETIN, June 28, 2002, at B6 (calling
for profiling persons of middle eastern background and characterizing the present practices as
“politically correct” and “public relations”).
23

thereby addressing concerns about racial profiling, at least on their face.52 A still experimental
screening system based on individual passenger history and background, however, is necessarily
more discriminating. If that system works as it is supposed to, persons with a spotless
background and good documentation should experience little difficulty in traveling. Others,
regardless of nationality, will continue to be inconvenienced. Under the standard screening
techniques that are generally observable today at airports, everyone entering an airport gate area
goes through a magnetometer, with full body and baggage searches conducted randomly or based
on individualized suspicion. But there are indications, and certainly allegations, that the rules are
not always applied equally.53 Persons who appear to be of Arab descent seem to be subject to
52

Section 110 of the Aviation and Transportation Safety Act requires “the screening of
all passengers and property, including U.S. mail, cargo, carry-on and checked baggage, and other
articles, that will be carried aboard a passenger aircraft operated by an air carrier.” 49 U.S.C.
44901(b) (2003). Various techniques for screening checked baggage for explosives are
permitted, including manual search. 49 U.S.C. 44901(e) (2003). Detailed regulations confirm
that persons or property entering the security zones of airports are submitting to potentially
complete searches of their persons and property. See, e.g., 49 CFR 1540.107, Submission to
Screening and Inspection. Under this model, the randomness and/or universality of searches
may mean that no one’s rights are invaded, as in the D.U.I. roadblock setting. See Michigan
Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
53

See, e.g., Kaukab v. Harris, 2003 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 13710 (N.D. Ill 2003) (civil action
alleging plaintiff singled out for strip search due to Muslim religion and Pakistani ethnicity);
Linda Greenhouse, War Zone: What Price Liberty? NEW YORK TIMES, Sept. 16, 2001, at 1 (noting
profiling and violence directed at Muslims); Susan Sachs, In the Search for Suspects,
Sensitivities Over Profiling, NEW YORK TIMES, Sept. 21, 2001, at A19; Eric Slater & Rebecca
Trounson, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Sept. 14, 2001, at 22 (noting violence and threats toward Arab
Americans and Muslims); Somini Sengupta, A Nation Challenges: Relations, NEW YORK TIMES,
Oct. 10, 2001 (at B1 (noting hate crimes and ethnic tensions); Phuong Ly & Petula Dvorak,
Travels & Travails, Japanese Americans Recall 40's Bias, Understand Arab Counterparts’ Fear,
WASHINGTON POST, Sep. 20, 2001, at B1 (noting ethnic bias incidents). In response to reports of
discrimination against passengers who appeared to be Arab immediately after September 11, the
Department of Transportation ordered all airlines to stop such practices. USDOT Issues Caution
on Airline Discrimination, Sept. 21, 2001, available at http://www.caasf.org/0901/a1-usdot.htm.
In response, the president of Delta Airlines wrote all employees a strongly worded letter
pledging high security standards but deploring race or national origin discrimination. To All
Delta Employees Worldwide, Sept. 21, 2001, available at
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more stringent stops and searches, probably because the reality of the security process is that
many actions depend heavily on discretionary judgments by security officers. The Department
of Justice’s guidelines on racial profiling acknowledge this reality. While they prohibit racial
and ethnic profiling in criminal investigations, they permit such profiling in the vague area of
“national security.”54

III. Conclusion: Adding the Pieces Together

The most severe intrusions on personal privacy remain isolated, and the worst fears of
terror and our responses to terror have not materialized. But they are always “just around the
corner,” which means that the immediate post-September 11 belief that “things will never be the
same again” has proven at least partially correct. The sense of safety is gone. Aware of that
loss, most people have proven to be resilient and willing to endure inconvenience. For a long
http://www.caasf.org/0901/deltamemo.pdf.
It may be (or then again, it may not be) a sign of progress when Arab profiling at airports
becomes a joke told by an Arab-American – “‘I went to the airport check-in counter,’ says
Egyptian-American comic Ahmed Ahmed to a packed room at L.A.’s Comedy Store. ‘The lady
behind the counter asked if I packed my bags myself. I said yes – and they arrested me.’”
Loraine Ali, Laughter’s New Profile, NEWSWEEK, April 22, 2002, at 61.
54

In 2003, the Department of Justice issued policy guidance to prevent federal law
enforcement use of racial profiling. Press Release, Justice Department Issues Policy Guidance to
Ban Racial Profiling, June 17, 2003, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/June/
03_crt_355.htm. The Justice Department’s Fact Sheet on Racial Profiling issued at the same time
explains the action and condemns most uses of racial profiling as immoral and unhelpful. The
decision does not apply to terrorism, however, although the Department warns against reliance
on generalized stereotypes of terrorists. The Fact Sheet states this terrorism exception in several
different ways, with the clearest being “[g]iven the incalculably high stakes involved in
[terrorism] investigations, federal law enforcement officers who are protecting national security
or preventing catastrophic events (as well as airport security screeners) may consider race,
ethnicity, alienage, and other relevant factors.” Fact Sheet, p. 5, available as a pdf file
accompanying the Press Release at the Department of Justice’s internet site.
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time, air security searches seemed to be dogmatically democratic, non-ethnic, and non-ageist.
People were amused by stories of former Vice President Gore being subjected to a full body
search at an airport,55 and I once observed a three-year old boy getting a full security treatment,
including an item-by- item search of his Winnie the Pooh backpack. There is still talk of racial
and ethnic profiling being unacceptable, and President Bush has been very careful to speak out
against ethnic suspicion.56
But the public may lose its patience with slow and cumbersome passenger screening. If
there continue to be no terrorist attacks at airports, and if the government responds to increased
costs and criticism by loosening security, will it do sofor all passengers, or only for whites or
other people who are “obviously” not Arab terrorists? Will we still be amused by searches of
patently harmless travelers when the sharpest edge of fear is gone, and when we want to get on
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E.g., Oh, for Air Force II: Airline Twice Gives Gore 2nd Look, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES,
JUNE 15, 2002, AT 12; Transportation – Prime Suspects, FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, June 20, 2002,
at B6;Commentary, Silly Security, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, June 27, 2002, at 22 (letter to the editor).
56

President Bush made two pertinent, and probably well planned, statements on this issue
in the week after September 11. The first was at Washington, D.C.’s Islamic Center, where he
emphasized that most Muslims were appalled by the attacks, that Islam is a peaceful religion,
and that Muslims in this country should not be subject to intimidation or discrimination. Office
of the Press Secretary, “Islam is Peace” Says President, September 17, 2001, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/release/2001/09/print/20010917-11.html. The second was at an
informal press conference two days later, at which the President rejected the idea that the war
was a religious one and stated: “[T]here are millions of good Americans who practice the
Muslim faith who love their country as much as I love the country, who salute the flag as
strongly as I salute the flag.” Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President at Photo
Opportunity with House and Senate Leadership, Sept. 19, 2001, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/print/20010919-8.html.
New Jersey Attorney General John Farmer received substantial criticism when he
suggested that there would be racial profiling in response to the September 11 attacks, but then
clarified that he “would not sanction or condone racial profiling” in the investigation. Susan
Sachs, In the Search for Suspects, Sensitivities Over Profiling, NEW YORK TIMES, Sept. 26, 2001,
at A19.
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our airplanes and start moving? Ethnic profiling may seem reasonable to many people and play
a larger role when fewer passengers are singled out for full searches.
This prospect is especially alarming given the variety of scenarios that arise in the new
security state. Consensual police encounters are not searches or seizures and are therefore are
not regulated by the fourth amendment. These include questioning at airports, similar practices
on buses,57 and police requests for identification in public areas.58 When they are conducted
randomly or on the basis of legitimate individualized suspicion, we accept those encounters as
good police work. When they are done primarily to one ethnic group, on the other hand, such
encounters breed resentment and can destroy confidence in our legal system. If we want to focus
on persons who appear to be Arab, we may still do a good job of searching for members of Al
Qaeda, but we risk going backwards in terms of the public understanding of our privacy rights
under the fourth amendment. Even worse, the courts may come to agree with that new
understanding, and to allow racial or ethnic profiling in other forms of criminal investigation as
well, unraveling the reforms of the pre-September 11 period.
At airports, mandatory questioning by armed security personnel and intrusive searches of
57

Law enforcement officers will sometimes follow a practice of walking through buses,
questioning passengers and often asking permission to search baggage, as part of drug, weapons,
or illegal alien interdiction efforts. E.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 197-98 (2002);
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 431 (1991); Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 335 (2000).
The practice is sometimes called “working the buses.” E.g., Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 703
A.2d 25, 27 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997). For an article criticizing the tendency of courts to describe
these actions as encounters rather than stops, see Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps
and the Psychology of Coercing, 2002 Sup. Ct. Rev. 153.
58

See, e.g., United States v. Ringold, 335 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2003) (pumping gas);
United States v. Waldon, 206 F.3d 597 (6th Cir. 2000) (standing at bus stop); United States v.
Young, 105 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997) (walking down street); United States v. Tavolacci, 895 F.2d
1423 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (not a stop unless officers “throw their official weight around unduly”).
See also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) and United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544
(1980), discussed earlier, which address such encounters in airports.
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the person and personal effects are commonplace and either exempt from the fourth amendment
or per se reasonable under it. Law enforcement collection of personal data has long been exempt
from judicial oversight due to fourth amendment caselaw defining searches and seizures. In a
world where technology has given the government extraordinary ability to intrude and where
terrorist attacks have provided a justification to use that ability, the cost to privacy can be very
high.
The public expects the police to follow the Constitution and the courts to enforce it.
Although public anger and fear over crime have led to substantial public support for actions such
as automatic full body searches of suspected drug dealers and house-to-house searches for
criminals, the courts have always prevented such public opinions from guiding constitutional
interpretation. “Reasonableness” has only recently become a vehicle for reducing the necessary
level of suspicion and eliminating the need for prior judicial authorization. Strong public support
for aggressive security actions designed to protect us from terrorists should not be taken as
strong public support for losing our rights, especially outside of terrorism investigations.
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